Minnesota Prosecutorial Misconduct

A study of criminal appeals from 1970 to the present revealed 240 Minnesota cases in which a defendant alleged prosecutorial error or misconduct. In 32, judges ruled a prosecutor’s conduct prejudiced the defendant and would have reversed or remanded the conviction, sentence or indictment. In five, a dissenting judge or judges thought the prosecutor’s conduct prejudiced the defendant.

Out of the 32 cases in which courts ruled the prosecutor’s conduct prejudiced the defendant, 24 involved improper trial arguments, two involved improper tactics and six involved the prosecution withholding evidence from the defense.

The Hennepin County District Attorney’s office, which covers the Minneapolis area, was responsible for 88 of the 240 criminal cases in which defendants alleged misconduct on appeal. In 12 of the cases, judges reversed or remanded the conviction, sentence or indictment because of the prosecutor’s conduct.

Hennepin County prosecutor Fred Karasov’s closing arguments prompted appeals courts to reverse two defendants’ convictions.

In a 1992 sexual conduct case, Karasov made a “patently improper� closing argument encouraging the jury to misuse evidence and convict the defendant because he was a “bad guy.�

After the reversal, the state appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled that Karasov’s “bad guy� argument was not prejudicial and reinstated the conviction.

In 1994, the state Supreme Court reversed Verdell Shannon’s second-degree murder conviction because Karasov misled the jury about how to reach a verdict.

Part of Shannon’s defense at trial was that he was high on crack and alcohol, which contributed to the “heat of passion� and rendered the crime manslaughter instead of murder.

“You look at it as a reasonable person, meaning any one of you, who wasn’t on drugs or who wasn’t taking alcohol…would what she did have provoked any of you to have killed her?� Karasov said to the jury. “That’s the kind of proof you would need in order to lower his crime from murder in the second degree…to heat of passion manslaughter.�

The court ruled that he misstated the law because the jury should have decided if it was a heat of passion murder by deciding how Shannon felt at the time, which would include being on crack and alcohol.

“In all probability, the improper, misleading, and confusing argument of the experienced prosecutor, who knew or should have recognized its impropriety, created the confusion that the trial court declined to correct,� wrote Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Jeanne Coyne.

“We were all kind of shocked because it really wasn’t a misstatement,� Karasov said of the reversal. “That really wasn’t our understanding of what a reasonable person was at the time.�

He said this reversal was especially frustrating.

“I was really bummed out,� Karasov said. “Not that I haven’t been reversed before—but on this one I did everything right and would never intentionally misstate the law.�

After the reversal, he said, Shannon pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a sentence of 86 months in prison, 64 months fewer than his original sentence.

Minnesota lawmakers later passed legislation eliminating drug and alcohol use from the definition of what a reasonable person would do.

“They took what happened in Shannon and said no, here’s the way it’s going to work in the courts,� Karasov said. “You’re under alcohol or drug use; that’s your problem.�

State courts have recently examined Hennepin County prosecutor Mary Hannon’s trial tactics as well.

In 1995, the state appeals court reversed a criminal sexual conduct conviction because Hannon made a prejudicial closing argument. She referred to a second alleged victim even though there were no charges filed, urged the jury to send a message to the children of the world that “we will protect you� and implied the jury would be defying common sense if they did not convict.

During jury selection in Louis Buggs’ 1996 first-degree murder trial, Hannon struck a potential juror who said she had concerns about the justice system treating blacks unfairly. The potential juror also said she lived with and had a child with a black man.

In 1998, Buggs appealed his conviction to the state Supreme Court, alleging Hannon made improper arguments to the jury, attempted to introduce inadmissible evidence, conveyed her personal opinion to the jury through body language and discriminated in jury selection.

The majority of judges found Hannon’s body language and whispers to co-counsel about the credibility of a witness to be the most serious errors and recommended that the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board take a look at her behavior in the case. Despite a “strong distaste for such conduct,� the court upheld Buggs’ conviction. Justice Alan Page dissented because he thought Hannon discriminated in jury selection.

“…We must look beyond the limited box of our own experience,� Page wrote. “In this case, that means being able to see and understand the racial impact of permitting prosecutors to exclude from service prospective jurors who do nothing more than express concerns about the racial makeup of the jury panel and our justice system’s treatment of color.�

Page also noted the irony in the majority’s holding that removing the potential juror based on her belief in the fairness of the judicial system was permissible.

“After all, she did nothing more than give voice to concerns this court raised in its task force report,� he wrote. “That report contains over 70 finding detailing racial bias in the judicial system.�

The lawyers disciplinary board took no action against Hannon.
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